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In an opening vignette to an otherwise insightful article, Carol M. Rose (2003) compares 
people who hold intellectual property rights to poor villagers in India. They put effort and time 
into developing small but productive properties, only to have the wild tiger or rogue elephant of 
the public domain trample them or eat them up. In extreme cases, IP "villages" are abandoned 
and left to "the jungle" of public property. But Rose neglects another part of the story, and that is 
that the villagers are also hungry, and while they do not directly consume tigers, they do consume 
the environment a tiger needs to survive. This paper argues, from the perspective of legal 
pluralism, that both private and public properties are voracious. In recent western developments, 
they each expand by trying to 'eating the other up'. Western property theory promotes this 
dualistic game of voracious property types. In exporting this game world wide through 
privatization, international agreements and regulations many other more balanced approaches to 
property, which fall between the public/private divide, are being consumed as well (as in kin 
group corporate property, cultural property etc.).  
Such a dualistic model of property limits our understanding of the ways in which the 
property rights of different claimants are interdependent. This interdependence arises not only 
from legal institutions that mediate property rights, but also from social institutions that 
determine and distribute rights, and how these legal and social institutions interface. The three-
tiered model presented in this paper--ideological, legal, and social--reveals the systemic nature of 
property rights. Issues concerning 'new' forms of intellectual property, as well as the management 
of natural resources, highlight the limitations of the ideological approach to property rights, 
which largely ignores the legal and social relationships embedded in these forms of property. 
This paper explores the implications of such voracious property for biodiversity.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
In this paper, I address the questions raised by new forms of property as a solution 
to conserving biodiversity, and the potential interaction of these efforts with ongoing 
situations of legal pluralism.  My research path has led from water and land rights in the 
uplands tribal areas of northern Philippines (Wiber 1991, 1993), to milk and manure 
quota in eastern Canada and Holland (Wiber 1995), to fishing quota in the Scotia-Fundy 
region (Wiber 2000).  Recently, I have followed the debates around other new forms of 
property, including tradable environmental allowances, and the patenting of various life 
forms.  My research has often involved situations where the state has been unable to 
establish a monopolistic legal regime (in the face of religious law, tribal law, customary 
law, multilateral agreements), or has itself created and perpetuated situations of legal 
pluralism through incompatible developments in various branches of state or international 
law, or when it recognizes the jurisdiction of some bodies of law for some actors in 
society but not others (see Wiber 1999, Wiber and Kennedy 2001).  I am particularly 
interested in the consequences of legal pluralism for the management of natural 
resources.  In my fisheries research, I work with community-based groups in eastern 
Canada who attempt a collective level of management despite privatizing regulation by 
                                                 





the federal government (through Individual Transferable Quotas issued by the 
Department of Fisheries and Oceans) (see Wiber in press).  Their community-based 
management has been more effective in producing equitable distribution of resource 
access, but might not necessarily produce long term resource sustainability.  What is 
certain is that private quota rights in fish have produced neither equity nor sustainability 
for major Scotia-Fundy commercial marine species.   
Here I examine a few of the underlying problems with promoting unrealistic 
versions of western property concepts as solutions to world-wide natural resource 
management problems.  A major challenge facing those interested in property is the inter-
textual nature of recent property studies -- incorporating as they do institutional 
economics, common property studies, game theory, resource management and public 
policy studies among others (see Rose 1998a).  This inter-textuality, I believe, contributes 
to what Wolf (2001:21) has called “a descent into triviality”.  In particular, in the 
privileging of the “Big Four” (state, commons, private and open access) as supposedly 
universal property forms, and in dualizing public and private loci for property rights, 
property theory has generally lost sight of the systematic nature of property regimes.  I 
suggest several ways in which the systemically-integrated nature of property regimes are 
downplayed or ignored under neoliberal restructuring arrangements.  I also suggest some 
ways in which simplistic property regime imports may not be conducive to environmental 
sustainability and biodiversity.  The main reason for this is that simplistic Western 
models are often caught up in a contest between two voracious kinds of property types 
(public versus private) – both of which appear to be growing by consuming the other. On 
the other hand the concept of legal pluralism or the "presence in a social field of more 
than one legal order" (Griffith 1986: 1) can force us to acknowledge  that many different  
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social fields can generate and enforce different rules, norms and cognitive repertoires. These 
different legal orders can protect various claims to use and control resources - or a variety 
of different property rights - by individuals or groups. Thus, the private-public dichotomy 
is an artificial simplification of a much more complex, overlapping and nuanced set of 
property relations. 
2.  RECENT PROPERTY DEVELOPMENTS 
Property, both as a theoretical concept and as a practical institution, has attracted 
a great deal of academic attention lately, probably because property has become one way 
to speak about and demand rights (Ignatieff 2000), and also because of recent innovations 
in technology and in society that have created much contestation while simultaneously 
pushing the property envelope to resolve those disputes (see F. and K. von Benda-
Beckmann and Wiber 2003). Many pluralist societies are caught up in violent contests 
over the (re)distribution of productive property, often after attempts to redress old wrongs 
(Peters 2003).  Anthropologists, environmentalists and development officers debate how 
to simultaneously protect indigenous rights and the environment (Brush 1993, Cleveland 
and Murray 1997).  Food security seems threatened in many Less Developed Nations as 
important plant staples are patented in the wealthy north, and thereby become subject to 
restrictions on research and commercial development.
2 State or parastatal agricultural 
research regimes of 50 years standing are being privatized under restructuring pressure 
from the World Bank, such that commercial crop seed production and distribution has 
been disrupted in some nations (Zerbe 2001).  Pharmaceutical conglomerates threaten to 
                                                 
2 As with GoldenRice™ - a provitamin A enhanced rice strain in which over 70 patents exist, mostly 
unrecognized in major rice producing  nations (Binenbaum et al. 2003).  
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enclose the environmental knowledge of many local peoples.
3 Tradable environmental 
allowances create rights in airborne emissions, fish stocks, manure and waterborne 
pollutants (Rose 1999) that are held and traded by individuals, corporations and nation 
states, and often highly contested at every level.  National parks (as conservation 
reserves) are being managed by private corporations, state agencies, local indigenous 
communities, international conservation organizations, or consortiums of all of the above 
– management often contested by international corporations with preexisting mining or 
timber concessions (Wali 2002).  Owners of recently re-privatized lands in the former 
socialist eastern Europe reject any environmental responsibilities (Sikor 2003).  Riots 
have erupted in Brazil when water systems were threatened with privatization (Hall et al. 
2002).  Nation states are contracting with pharmaceutical corporations to develop 
commercial bio-databases for the human genetics of their component populations 
(Pálsson and Hardardóttir 2002).  An academic conference in Berkeley discusses the 
international trade in humans, their labor, their sexual and reproductive capacities, their 
children, in human organs, and in other body parts (stem cells, immortal cell lines).  How 
has property theory attempted to address these increasingly complex problems and 
property arrangements? 
 
3.  WHITHER PROPERTY THEORY? 
In a recent paper, Keebet and Franz von Benda-Beckmann and I (2003) point out 
that current property debates are so loaded with a heavy freight of assumptions, 
                                                 
3 The Indian neem tree has over 60 U.S. patents applied to it, all contested, as is the University of 
California and Lucky Biotech of Japan patenting on two natural sweeteners from Africa (katempfe and 
serendipity berry) (Ostergard, Tubin and Altman 2001).  
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presuppositions and political and ideological stands that property analysis has become 
seriously hampered.  We argue that this problem can be redressed through two approaches.  
First, we need to take the bundle of rights metaphor seriously and more deeply explore its 
implications.  Any analytical framework to examine property must be capable of capturing 
the complexities and manifold variations of property in different societies and in different 
periods of history, as well as the different functions that property may have.  Furthermore, it 
must be able to differentiate between the separate analytical layers at which property 
manifests itself in ideologies, in legal institutions, in actual social relationships, and in 
social practices (of production, exchange and reproduction).  Further, it must pay attention 
to the interrelations between these phenomena.  The form property takes in any one of these 
layers can be very different and cannot be reduced one to the other.  Finally, any analytical 
approach must somehow encompass the plurality of property ideologies and legal 
institutions in many contemporary states, often rooted in different sources of legitimacy, 
including: the official legal system of the state with all its internal contradictions, traditional 
or customary law, multiple bodies of religious law, plus rapidly developing international 
law.  
We must generate more accurate descriptions of the ways in which property is 
actually organized and used before there can be much hope for theorizing about 
interrelations between types of property rights and economic performance or ecologically 
sustainable resource use.  In particular, we need a sophisticated analytical framework if we 
are to come to grips with the developments in new forms of property, whether created 
through technological and bio-physical innovations, or as a consequence of increasing 
government interference in the more conventional property rights to productive resources.   
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The second solution to property theory triviality is to keep the systematic nature of 
property in mind when discussing the potential impact of any change in property 
arrangements.  Change arrives, often without the theorists noticing or paying much 
attention.  And change is often introduced not through reforms to rights distribution, or to 
the nature of the objects given property status, nor even to the definition of rights or the 
source(s) of rights creation.  Change, as a result of the systematic nature of property, will 
often come from directions no one expects, as some of the above examples suggest.  I will 
briefly discuss what I mean by taking both the bundle metaphor and the systemic nature of 
property seriously before looking at the implications of this for sustaining biodiversity, or 
for any other perceived good that property arrangements are thought to further. 
 
4.  TAKING THE BUNDLE OF RIGHTS METAPHOR SERIOUSLY 
Conceiving of property as a bundle of rights in order to explore the relationships 
between persons with respect to valuable goods, material and immaterial, is a concept 
rarely elaborated and followed up consistently.
4  One advantage of doing so is that 
property is not defined in overly simplistic terms, a problem endemic to much current 
property research.  Bromley and Cernea, for example, view property as a right to a 
benefit stream, the rights therein being dependent on the ability to “call on the collective 
to stand behind one’s claim” (cited in both Lu 2001, and in Knox McCulloch, Meinzen-
Dick, Hazell 1998).  However, as many of my introductory examples demonstrate, 
property is complicated by (among other things) the variation between collectives who 
                                                 
4 For exceptions see Schlager and Ostrom 1992, 1996; F. von Benda-Beckmann 1979, 1995, 2000, 2001; 
K. von Benda-Beckmann et al. 1997; F. and K. von Benda-Beckmann 1999; Wiber 1993.  
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might support alternative claimants and the ideologies they deploy as justification, and 
the wide variation in how these conflicting legal justifications characterize a benefits 
stream. 
Taking the bundle metaphor seriously also tends to work against any notion of 
“cookie cutter” property types.  When the focus is a descriptive rather than proscriptive, 
property relationships can be seen to vary dramatically across four major elements, 
including: the social units that are thought capable of holding property rights and 
obligations; the construction of valuables as property objects; the different kinds of 
relationships established in terms of rights and obligations; and the temporal dimension 
of property relationships.  In each of these elements, there is a wide range of variation 
both within and between societies and legal systems.  The social entities that can be 
holders of property relationships range from individuals to larger groups or associations 
of people, kin-groups, co-operatives, villages, large industrial enterprises, the state or 
even “mankind”.  In such cases where more than one person holds property together, 
there is a wide variety of relations possible between the members of the group.  
Constructions of material and immaterial valuables as property objects also show wide 
variation.  Most legal systems construct important differences by establishing categories 
of owned goods, and attach quite different legal consequences to them.  A major 
distinction in many legal systems has been the one between movable and immovable 
goods, another in recent years has been the distinction between tangible and intangible 
goods (C.M. Rose 2003). The range of autonomy for an actor, especially with respect to 
alienation or transferability, over different property objects varies considerably for goods 
in such different categories.    
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Technological, economic and political developments lead to an ever expanding 
variety of goods in which property rights can be established, creating a constant need to 
expand existing categories to include such valuables or to devise new categories for them.  
These innovations can challenge existing property categories along a number of dimensions: 
along the public and private divide, between movable and immovable categories, and across 
ethical or moral boundaries that separate things we feel comfortable turning into 
commodities and those we do not.  Patenting life, especially important food crops or folk 
biopharmaceuticals has strained the intellectual property envelop, for example.
5  Valuables 
created under administrative law, such as tradable environmental allowances, enter the 
marketplace and take on property characteristics, with the consequence that pressure is 
brought on the government to regularize them as property.
6  The market is often a driving 
force in this regard; debates about “new property” often result when objects or valuables 
enter the marketplace for the first time.  Examples include increasingly intangible and 
fragmented valuables such as bioinformatics, stem cells, and domain names on the 
internet.
7  
                                                 
5  Bettig (1996:2) notes that the “peculiar nature” of informational and cultural commodities places them 
within the realm of “public goods” (the product cannot be used up by any one consumer) and that these 
commodities are “prone to market failure.”  He also notes, however, that capitalist firms have learned to 
use a variety of mechanisms to overcome this ‘public goods as commodities syndrome,’ including 
copyright, patents, trademarks, compulsory licensing, packaging, encryption, price discrimination and so 
on.  One might argue that having learned these lessons well with music and video, the corporate sector was 
well positioned to take advantage of the information explosion in bio-technology. 
6 C. Rose (1999) has called this the phenomenon of “too much property”.  The government discovers there 
are flaws within a concession regime such that public objectives are not being entirely met.  They address 
the flaws through another layer of “command-and-control” regulation, only to find yet more “new 
property” categories emerging as a result. 
7 Donna Haraway (2000) is critical of the role of science in particularizing the complete to make the parts 
subject to different rules than the whole – a process based on realms of western reductionist scientific 
knowledge production.  As with gene patents, the scientific labor of particularizing the complete then 
becomes the basis for a property claim.  
 
9
Another aspect that seems new is the kinds of property holding entities that have 
rights in property objects, as in ‘cultural’ property, which requires delineating cultural 
boundaries with some precision (see Brush 1993).  Other forms of property are 
considered new because of the property relations that they establish and that are still 
evolving, as in rights to knowledge.  Bioprospecting and biopiracy, for example, are both 
terms to describe western pharmaceutical research among non-western cultural groups 
and suggest some of the complexities involved in understanding the often contested 
nature of relationships involved.   
Bundles of rights 
The bundle of rights metaphor can facilitate analysis of the possible variation in 
the relationships between property holders and others with respect to culturally 
recognised valuables.  Property relationships shape the contexts under which (full or 
limited) property may be appropriated, acquired or maintained.  The character of rights and 
of obligations are relative and variable, with respect to rights to property (more secure or 
less secure), the obligations of right holders (weaker or stronger), and of sanctioning 
mechanisms (wide or narrow jurisdictions).  Property rights may also be contingent upon a 
specific social status and the fulfilment of corresponding duties.  Theoretical rights may also 
require some negotiation and a process of decision-making before they can be converted 
into rights that can be acted upon.  
The bundle metaphor is useful here in at least four different ways, which I 
illustrate with several examples.  At the broadest level, the bundle metaphor attempts to 
capture analytically the total range of rights, the potential totality of “sticks in the bundle”  
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that can be distributed over different holders of rights and obligations.
8 One example is 
the potential communitarian and commercial interests considered valid with respect to the 
genetic stock of a staple plant variety (rice, potato, corn, wheat).  These sticks (rights and 
obligations) comprise not only access to the valuable (in the form of seed stock) and to a 
variety of uses (as at the farm level), but also the management of the valuable (as in 
agricultural research labs), the (legal institutional) possibilities of transfer and 
inheritance, and the political or religious (legislative) authority to regulate and decide on 
(seed) distribution and associated (farmers’) rights and responsibilities.  In all societies a 
distinction is made between rights to regulate, supervise, represent  in outside relations, and 
allocate property on the one hand, and rights to use and exploit economically property 
objects on the other.
9   Many have conflated this distinction into two separate types of loci 
for property rights, the public (often seen in ‘Leviathan’ terms as ‘the state’) and the 
private (often seen only to apply to the individual).  In fact, most property rights have both 
public and private domain aspects.
10  These two loci have become dualized with each being 
seen as a solution for the shortcomings of the other.  The debate seems to be one in which 
private property is viewed as a brake on the worst excesses of the legislators, while public 
rights are seen as a brake on the worst excesses of private owners.  For example, the control 
and management rights to genetic resources might be vested in the highest political authority 
                                                 
8  Examples of scholars who have attempted to delineate the possible total range of rights in a valuable 
include Bromley 1989 and Schlager and Ostrom 1992. 
9  Gluckman called these two levels “estates of administration” and “estates of production” (1972:89).   
10 See Weintraub (1997), Geisler and Daneker (2000), F. von Benda-Beckmann (2000) on the multiple and 
quite divergent meanings embedded in the terms ‘public’ and ‘private’.  See also C. Rose (2003), who 
notes the complex constellation of types of ‘public’ interests inherited from Roman law, and also expands 
on their ‘private’ face.  In the case of res publica, for example, found primarily in physical spaces required 
for mobility such as navigational waterways, roads, the internet, these spaces are actually the “backbone of 
commerce.”  This argument may also be made for agricultural genetic stock, which under conditions of 




in order to protect wide accessibility at the level of the user.  But would this outcome 
logically follow?  One suggestion for an alternative to TRIPS, for example, is sui generis 
laws in Less Developed Countries that would impose ‘prior informed consent’ on 
researchers employing genetic stock accessed from LDCs (Plahe and Nyland 2003).  This 
might work if national authorities could be trusted to always act in the best interest of all of 
the members of society, something that many commentators ask leave to doubt.  There is 
also the problem of the many levels of ‘public’ authorities who could demand some level of 
administrative control, some well recognized and some highly contested but functioning 
well in their own setting.  Many such authorities demand some degree of control over how 
life will be commodified or made available for a broader human benefit, or how the 
environment and biological diversity will be protected (Kirsch 2001, Orlove and Brush 
1996, Pálsson and Hardardóttir 2002).  The question is further complicated by the fact 
that actual use may diverge quite sharply from those ideal principles enacted by such 
administrators. 
The second use of the bundle of rights metaphor illuminates specific property 
categories (however legally elaborated), such as private property ownership or inherited 
lineage property, by viewing these categories as representing a bundle of rights in 
themselves.  In most legal regimes, there are "master categories" that encapsulate the range 
of rights bundled into each separate property category.  In Canada, for example, master 
categories of rights applied to land include private property (which can be owned by 
individuals, by corporate groups and even by a government agency), public or “Crown” 
lands, lands held in the public trust, timber leases, mining concessions, aboriginal reserves,  
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municipal land, national parks and others.
11  But remember too that among these are forms 
in which lesser, conditional and temporary rights have been derived from more 
encompassing forms (i.e. leases, rentals, concessions).  These rights are not always easy to 
lump into private and public categories.  The problem is even more difficult when applied to 
the parts that have been increasingly abstracted from a whole.  To return to the crop variety 
example used above, an individual farmer in Mexico might assume that he/she holds a 
particular category of rights in their own bean seed (as private property) based on their own 
local legal regime, with associated rights to give seed to neighboring farmers or to sell their 
crop across the border in the United States.  However, from the perspective of another legal 
regime, the bundle here may look very different.  The holder of such bean seeds may have 
few or no rights, since many or most of the economic use rights have been recognized under 
U.S. patent law to be held by PODners, a company which has patented the bean variety, a 
claim challenged by the Center for International Tropical Agriculture, the Mexican 
government and others (Magnus 2002).
12  Such cases illuminate how property rights (and 
the contests over them) may not only be derived from legal regulations of the private 
domain but also of the public domain, especially when dealing with new forms of 
property.
13 
The third use of the bundle metaphor is to illustrate how the total property 
interests held by a single person (or other property holding unit) will form a bundle 
comprised of quite different kinds of property rights.  He or she may own a house, private 
                                                 
11 For a master list of “protected areas”, see Orlove and Brush 1996:332. 
12 Residual and provisional rights are relative notions.  A provisional property relation is provisional only in 
relation to the residual one from which it is derived, and itself is residual in relation to other rights.  One of 
the more interesting features of the patenting life debate is who has rights in this new valuable or set of 
valuables, and which rights are superior and which are derivative? 




land, financial holdings, pawned land, agricultural seed and animals, some component of 
lineage property including fruit from selected trees, rights to extract from a common 
resource, and units of water from a collective irrigation system.  This use of the bundle 
metaphor allows us to examine the ways in which a single person or property holder’s 
rights can form interacting sets, with implications for the uses and exchange value of any 
one piece of the total property in which they have rights.  Consider an international 
corporation, for example, that seeks to acquire rights to potentially useful plant genetics, 
while at the same time owning plant varieties developed at their research farms, the 
laboratories that do genetic testing, the genetic patents and process patents that emerge 
from the lab research, the databases that place the results in a broader genetic context, the 
patents for herbicides and pesticides used in agriculture, commercial seed outlets, and 
even a scientific publishing house.  This highly concentrated “ownership” of rights in 
particular kinds of objects, processes and outcomes, requires new levels of analysis to 
identify consequences for others, who may argue to protect academic freedom, public 
interest in crop seed biodiversity, or any other of a long list of potential values.  Here the 
legal pluralism concept can help us identify overlapping social fields that would confer 
these property rights to different domains, highlighting areas of conflict and assertion of 
one system against other competing ones. 
The fourth way to use the bundle metaphor is to examine the rights that have 
accreted to a given property object. In many cases, the rights accreting to an object are 
adjudicated under a single system of law – in other words, if I own a house and you rent 
it from me, our common legal system is able to sort out our respective rights and 
responsibilities.  But what happens when you cross boundaries of legal regimes?  
Consider, for example, a DNA test based on two genes (BRCA1 and BRCA2) that helps  
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to predict the risk of developing breast cancer (see special issue of New Internationalist 
2002: 25, Godrej 2002).  Myriad Genetics, a Utah-based biotechnology company, first 
patented the test, and then placed over 25 patents on these two genes, and the proteins 
related to them, attempting thereby to limit any further medical uses.  They argue that 
testing for these genes must be done through their labs, regardless of where in the world 
the patient is located.  European labs are boycotting Myriad and flout the patents by 
continuing to test for the genes.  The French government is mounting a legal challenge of 
the patents in the European Patent Office.  If we consider BRCA1 and BRCA2 as 
individual property objects, we can investigate that total package of rights claims that 
have accreted to them as a result of the process of their discovery, their presence in 
thousands of individual women, their documentation, patenting and use in medical 
testing, and their objectification in different legal regimes.  Here the bundle metaphor is 
able to expose the conflicting legal regimes concerned with one property object, as well 
as the different ways that rights are defined under these different legal regimes. 
With the help of the bundle metaphor, then, one can arrive at a differentiated 
description and comparison of the different aspects of property relationships in patenting 
life.  It shows that the four conventional property categories -- open access resources, 
private individual ownership, common/communal property, state/public ownership -- are 
not useful analytical guides nor sufficient descriptive categories for dealing with the 
complexity of bundled property rights involved in such new forms of property.
14  The 
bundle typology also suggests that property categories, such as individual or state 
ownership, are often theorized in Western scholarship without paying sufficient attention 
                                                 
14 For a detailed critique of the Big Four, see F. von Benda-Beckmann 2001.  
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to the range of other rights pertaining to the property object in question.
15  In particular, 
property rights tend to be thought of solely in relation to the realm of the private domain, 
disregarding the public rights pertaining to such property.  Private property is also usually 
identified with private individual ownership, ignoring the very real differences when the 
user is an individual, a joint or communal owner, or member of a group, association, or 
corporation.  Secondly, because of the preoccupation with ownership rights, a wide 
variety of individual rights others may hold in property objects are downplayed, such as 
rights of tenants, of holders of a mortgage, of marital partners, or of licenses and 
concessions.  These rights also may be held individually, or in various forms of group 
property or as state property.  In the category of common or communal property, 
furthermore, radically different mixes of rights of individuals, and of smaller and larger 
social groups are thrown together into one theoretical category. 
 
BUNDLES AND THEIR SYSTEMIC EMBEDDEDNESS  
 
We can apply the concept of bundles also to the systemic incorporation and 
embeddedness of property in the wider political, social and economic organization.  At 
the level of theoretical property relations, property law is just one part of wider, more 
encompassing sets of organizational and legitimatory structures and institutions.  Thus, 
property is “systemic” in a number of different ways.  For example, it is a part of a larger 
interdependent assemblage of legal ideas and practices, as in the fact that property law is 
part of a wider set of law that also is constitutive for property.  Property relations may be 
structured by property law, tax law, environmental law, family law, and corporate law, to 
                                                 
15 C. Rose (1998a) discusses how much of the complex dogmatic aspects of property law are a response to 
these real complexities.  
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name but a few.  At another level of system organization, each single form of property 
comes as part of a complex of property forms.  For example, the much debated tragedy of 
the commons can only be understood in relation to private individual property in the form 
of cattle that graze on the land.  Furthermore, property is typically multifunctional.  For 
example, a particular plant variety may not only have economic value as a subsistence 
crop, but may also be thought to contribute to social security, have a religious value, and 
be important for ethnic identification, as with many maize varieties in the Mexican 
uplands.  And property is typically linked with and made useful through a number of 
other institutions, including market, transportation, educational and public health, among 
others.  Alexander (in press) has shown how this systemic nature of property has turned 
large parts of former socialist states into economic wastelands, as a factory here or a retail 
outlet there was privatized, while the rest of the infrastructure fell into collapse, rendering 
the new private property profitless and depriving the workers of many social services that 
used to be part of the socialist industrial complex.  Moreover, in many societies there is a 
plurality of normative orders such that each establishes their own property regime with 
their own specific property categories and institutional backing.  Further, these usually 
have many important interconnections, one with the other (see Wiber 1991, F. von 
Benda-Beckmann 1992, F. and K. von Benda-Beckmann 1994, K. von Benda-Beckmann 
1981, 1984). 
The degrees of interdependence will vary in such systems of which property is a 
part. While legal institutional orders are rarely fully systematized to the extent claimed in 
contemporary European legal ideology, changes in other parts of the legal order often 
spill over into property law, or changes in property law may be constrained by the 
structure of the wider order (see K. von Benda-Beckmann 2003).  For example, change in  
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family law will affect property rights, as changes in women’s property rights may be 
constrained by the overall position of women in society.  Many societies have undergone 
change in the balance of property rights between individuals, groups and the public 
sphere which affect the entire system of property rights.  In similar fashion, the actual 
uses to which property is put are often constrained or enabled by the economic and 
political institutions in which property is embedded.  At the ideological level, this 
systemic nature of property is often forgotten and one property form is promoted over 
another without reference to these interactions.  Debates about desired property regimes 
often neglect the systemic character of property at the behavioral level and remain at the 
layer of ideology.  
In everyday dealings with property and especially in disputes, property ideologies 
and legal rules provide a repertoire of social resources through which people can 
rationalize and justify their interpretations of current property conditions or claims for 
change.  But the kind of social relationships that interacting parties are involved in, the 
range of property held, and the nature of the concrete embeddedness of property 
relationships may have a much stronger influence on people's dealings with property than 
property rules and types of rights.  Poor people who hold only provisional and temporary 
rights, e.g. as a tenant, in a property object owned by someone else, have different 
options and are likely to act differently from rich persons holding a variety of property 
rights.  The point here is that while property interactions maintain (or change or create 
new) social relationships, the maintenance or change are also outcomes of wider 
interactions with wider intended and unintended consequences.  This will be no less true 
of intellectual property rights and other “add and stir” property solutions to new kinds of  
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natural resource management issues, whether retaining biodiversity or indigenous/local 
knowledge, promoting economic growth, or solving food security problems. 
 
5.  PROPERTY AND CHANGE 
In an opening vignette to an otherwise insightful article, Carol M. Rose (2003) 
compares people who try to develop intellectual property to poor villagers in India.  They 
put effort and time into developing small but productive properties, only to have the wild 
tiger or rogue elephant of the public domain trample them or eat them up.  In extreme 
cases, intellectual property “villages” are abandoned and left to “the jungle” of public 
property.  But Rose neglects another part of the story, and that is that the villagers are 
also hungry, and while they do not directly consume tigers, they can consume much of 
the environment a tiger needs to survive.  She also ignores the fact that some tigers have a 
lot of support from well-endowed international NGOs, while the villagers have the high 
moral ground of “custom immemorial”.  In many settings, the legal regimes that 
endorse/discount property claims are numerous, much as are the demands to any 
particular property object.  Further, if one recognizes the implications of legal pluralism, 
both private and public property categories appear to be increasingly voracious, dualistic 
and universalizing property types.  In recent exports of western property approaches, the 
private and the public forms of property each grow and expand by trying to ‘eating the 
other up’.
16  While the process is particularly obvious in examples of ‘new forms of 
                                                 
16  Recent examples are expansive contests about the proper locus for property rights for many kinds of 
“new” property.  Macinko and Bromley (2002) have produced a glossy publication encouraging public 
stewardship of America’s fisheries (through limited term auctions) rather than “private fishing rights”.  
Magnus, Caplan and McGee (2002) explore public versus private ownership in “life”.  And Drahos and 
Braithwaite (2002) debate public versus corporate ownership of the knowledge economy.  The university 
campus is another setting for this debate.  Who should own “education” (see Turk 2000)?   
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property’ which create considerable anxiety, another locus of debate involves the 
environment and biodiversity (Rose 1998b, 1999).  What objects should be property 
(particularly given the commercial focus of intellectual property law)?  Should we allow 
patents on major food crop genomes?  Or on the human genome?  Or on potential 
pharmaceutical bonanzas?  What kinds of social entities should ideally hold the rights in 
such properties (private, communal, state)?  What kinds of rights should be involved 
(especially given arguments over externalities, transaction costs, economic growth, 
ecological sustainability)?  Can we respect the rights of all relevant stakeholders?  Does 
property law give us the flexibility to resolve these questions? And according to which 
property law?  Economists, ecologists, lawyers, anthropologists and sociologists are 
involved in these debates and increasingly they influence each other’s thinking.
17  But the 
view from ‘outside’ is often quite different.  Western property theory promotes a dualistic 
game of voracious property types, public eating up private and vice versa.  In exporting 
this game world wide (TRIPS, privatization, vs. common heritage, public interest), many 
other more balanced approaches to property (which fall between the public/private 
divide) are being consumed as well (as in kin group corporate property, farmers’ rights, 
cultural property rights).  I would suggest that such voracious property forms are harmful 
for biodiversity in both their extremes, primarily because they ignore both the systemic 
and the deep complexity of real property arrangements. 
The model I have discussed illustrates that ideologies, legal institutions and actual 
property relationships are different factors necessary to the analysis of property practices.  It 
                                                 
17 For example, Rose (1998a) notes a recent shift in legal property textbooks such that the most popular 
approach has shifted from a doctrinal to a ‘utilitarian’ explanation for property rights, largely drawn from 
economic theory.    
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also suggests that these property aspects cannot be reduced to each other because all are 
conditions for constraining and enabling property practices.  This is especially important 
for the analysis of the actual and imputed economic or ecological significance of certain 
types of property relations and processes of change. 
If the distinction between ideological and actual property relations is not 
problematized, it will be difficult to analyze their potential interrelations.  It becomes 
difficult to explore, for instance, whether certain types of property rights are likely to lead to 
concentration and accumulation of property by a few or to a relatively secure access to 
resources for the many,
18 whether they will have stronger or lesser functions for social and 
economic security,
19 or whether they are likely to lead to more or less sustainable resource 
use.
20   The von Benda-Beckmanns and I have argued that in most writings on the 
relationships between property and economic growth or ecological sustainability, categories 
of property rights are taken to affect resource allocation or sustainability of natural resources 
directly, while actual (and often highly contested) property relationships remain largely 
unnoticed.
21  In fact, what seems to be an outcome of rules and categorical property rights 
may be a result of the specific set of property relationships people are involved in and of the 
various kinds of property they hold, or even of the contests between property regimes to 
achieve dominance within a single social setting.  It goes beyond the scope of this paper to 
attempt a comprehensive analysis of the relations between ideological and actual property 
relations and various utilitarian goals (economic or environmental).  It also goes beyond 
                                                 
18  See Peters 2002, Wiber 2000, Wiber and Kearney 1996. 
19 F. von Benda-Beckmann 1990. 
20 See e.g. Feder and Feeny 1993:241. 
21 When the embeddedness of property relations is the focus, however, attention is usually on the 
embeddedness of the property relation in other types of social relationships, and the embeddedness of 
theoretical property rights in the legal (or ideological) bodies is neglected.  
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the scope of this paper to demonstrate the many ways that legal pluralism is affecting the 
real property relations people are actually involved in.  I only want to point out that a 
clear association or congruence cannot be assumed between western categories of 
property considered dominant in property ideology, and sets of actual property 
relationships and their significance to a given historical period or 
economic/environmental outcome. 
 
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
Paying attention to the systemic nature of property and to the contexts in which 
property relationships and property practices are embedded allows one to study property 
change in its context “from the ground up”, and without assuming too much about how 
legislative changes will affect behavior (as in whether private or public ownership is 
“best”).  Interestingly enough, a deeper understanding of property also contributes to the 
question: in what respects are the new properties really new?  Expanding state powers 
that encroach on the entitlements of property holders is not new, but there are new types 
of objects that result, such as fishing quota or human genome databases.  State regulation 
can create new property simply because people begin to use and dispute these 
instruments of state regulation as property or as infringing on property rights.  In fact, 
partitioning off parts of what used to fall under an older bundle of ownership (as in 
creating patent rights in important food crops) has a long tradition – consider British 
common law and the wasteland debate in British colonies.  Patenting life is an extreme 
example, and an example that has deep emotional underpinnings.  But as the von Benda-
Beckmanns and I have pointed out, much of the partitioning that took place in colonial  
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forests and wastelands had very similar emotional repercussions for those newly 
excluded.  The systemic view of property allows us to see how changes in property are 
not one-way processes.  Change may be initiated at any specific layer, and that change 
then typically feeds back into other layers, leading to many subsequent adjustments not 
always easy to predict.  Any attempt to better understand these loops of influence must 
begin with a more sophisticated tool kit for understanding property regimes and their 
wider contexts.  Only then can we begin to understand the relationship between specific 
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